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Work and Empowerment:
Women and Agriculture in South India

Smriti Rao1

Abstract
This paper explores the implications of women’s work in agriculture in Telangana, a region in the
state of Andhra Pradesh, India. I suggest that higher capital costs for cultivators postliberalization increased the pressure to contain wage costs in a region where women form the
majority of the agricultural wage labour force. Under such conditions, when women perform both
own-cultivation as well as agricultural wage work in the fields of others, they face pressure to
restrict bargaining for higher wages, contributing to a widening gender wage gap. To the extent
that wages shape intra-household bargaining power, the empowering effect of workforce
participation for such women would thus be blunted. From available NSS data I provide some
preliminary evidence in support of this argument.
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Introduction
There now exists a significant body of work studying the determinants of women’s
bargaining power within households and evaluating the conditions under which labour force
participation may or may not translate into women’s increased bargaining power in developing
country contexts. While wage employment is considered an important potential determinant of
increased female bargaining power within the household, it has become clear that its impact
depends upon the pecuniary and non-pecuniary conditions under which women work, as well as
the reasons why they participate (Agarwal 1997; Charusheela 2003).
This paper attempts to contribute to this literature through a study of women’s work in
rural Telangana, a relatively poor, agrarian region in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India. This
region, along with other parts of India, has witnessed two rounds of economic reforms or
liberalization policies beginning in the early 1990s, first at the national and then at the regional
government level. The main effect of these polices upon Telangana agriculture in the 1990s was
‘immiserising growth’ with a sharp increase in the input costs of agriculture at a time when yields
and output prices either fell or remained stagnant, exacerbating the problem of indebtedness
amongst farmers (Vakulabharanam 2005, Rao and Suri 2006). The effects of this agrarian crisis,
compounded by the weakened political voice of farmers in post-liberalization India, are seen as
contributory factors in the complex phenomenon of the suicides of male farmers in the region
(Suri 2006, K Nagaraj 2008). This paper adds a gender dimension to the analysis of agrarian
distress in the 1990s, focusing on the economic role of women in cultivator households during
this period.
While the debate over the causes of farmer suicides has focused attention on the plight of
male cultivators, I argue that the mechanism of transmission of this agrarian crisis is gendered.
Apart from the personal and economic consequences of high debt, I argue that there have also
been specific implications for the wages of women workers in agriculture. Based on observation
in the field, I suggest that the higher capital costs for cultivators post-liberalization have increased
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the pressure to contain wage costs in a region where women form the majority of the agricultural
wage labour force. Under such conditions, when women perform both own-cultivation as well as
agricultural wage work in the fields of others, they face greater pressure to restrict bargaining for
higher wages. To the extent that wages are a determinant of intra-household bargaining power, a
widening gender wage differential reduces the chances that wage work will increase women’s
bargaining power within the household. As a result the empowering effect of workforce
participation for such women may have been blunted in the aftermath of liberalization.
I use village level field observations to motivate the study and individual level National
Sample Survey(NSS) wage data to test the argument. While the availability of data does limit the
strength of the findings, they do suggest the validity of more research on women’s changing roles
as cultivators in India.
The literature on rural livelihood diversification suggests that older models of rural
households that assumed clear separations between different occupations, and the specialization
of household members in particular tasks may not be valid in many contexts (Ellis 1998). The
workers in Telangana I discuss were certainly engaged in the pursuit of multiple occupations.
This paper explores the implications of one subset of occupations performed by female workers
in the region’s agriculture.
The Agricultural Workforce in Telangana
Telangana is an interesting region to study, not just because of its long history of political
mobilization around issues of land redistribution, but also because Telangana, to an even greater
extent than other parts of South India, has a history of women’s participation in the agricultural
labour force (Sundarrayya 1972; Mies 1986; Lalitha and Kannabiran 1989). According to the
Indian Census, the female workforce participation rates of women in rural Telangana have been
around 40% over the last two decades, the highest rates of Andhra Pradesh’s three sub-regions.
In this section I trace the broad trends in the agricultural labour force in Telangana before
and immediately after liberalization using individual level data provided by the National Sample
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Survey (NSS)Quinquennial Employment and Unemployment Household Surveys. The NSS
‘rounds’ used for analysis in this chapter are the 38th round (83-84), the 43rd round (1987-88), the
50th round (93-94) and the 55th round (99-00). Given that liberalization policies were instituted at
the national level in 1991 but at the state level in 93-94, the 99-00 round is treated as the postliberalization period. Adults are defined as persons aged 15 and above in accordance with the
convention in Indian social science research.
In this paper, the term ‘economically active’ includes as workers both those performing
domestic/ household reproductive labour as well as non-domestic work. The term ‘non-domestic
worker’ excludes those engaged principally in reproductive work. 1% of the total male and 0.79%
of the total female worker population also reported their status as unemployed. Since their
occupational-type cannot be determined, they are excluded from the analysis in this paper.
The NSS surveys provide us with data on the ‘principal usual status’ of employment of
each member of the households surveyed. This is the occupation the respondent reports having
pursued for a majority of the year (i.e. 183 days or more). The NSS also asks respondents to list
their ‘daily status’, or the four most significant activities for the week in which they are being
interviewed. The survey then asks for the days they spent on each activity, and the total weekly
wages earned in the activities performed for hire. The occupation followed for a majority of days
in the week is then listed as the respondent’s ‘current weekly status’(cws).
Researchers of households in poor agrarian economies cast doubt upon the conceptual
usefulness of a ‘principal status’ classification, arguing that it obscures the multiple other forms
of work that respondents may be engaged in (Ellis 1998). Feminists have meanwhile long argued
against the use of such categories, given that women have almost always pursued multiple
occupations simultaneously indeed often and reported domestic work as their ‘principal status’
while engaging in different forms of part-time or seasonal non-domestic work. I combine
‘principal’ and ‘weekly’ status data in the initial analysis of macro-level trends to try to widen the
category somewhat. However, given the diversity of livelihood strategies pursued by rural
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households and particularly by women in these households, I later shift to the use of NSS ‘daily
status’ data. This allows me to include as wage labourers or cultivators those who report it as
being any one of their four activities in the week. The ‘daily status’ data also allows us to try to
explain the determinants of wages paid to individual workers.
Due to a steady increase in the number of adults reported as continuing students, the more
conventional female labour force participation rate (i.e. participation in non-domestic work) did
not increase. However, the percentage of principal and weekly status female non-domestic
workers within the pool of economically active adult women has risen over successive rounds,
i.e. the share of women reporting their occupation as domestic work has correspondingly fallen
(Table 1). The rise has been particularly steep after 1987-88 with up to 83% of economically
active women engaged primarily in non-domestic work by 99-00.
(Table 1 about here)
Combining principal and weekly status, we see a rising percentage of economically
active adult women and men employed in agriculture between 93-94 and 90-00 (Table 2). This
trend is quite the opposite of that predicted by proponents of liberalization in Andhra Pradesh
who expected the share of the population in agriculture to fall steadily and go down to 20% by
2020 (GoAP 1999).
(Table 2 about here)
In line with historical trends, women comprised 55% of the agricultural wage labour
force in 99-00 while men were in a majority when it came to own-account cultivators (Table 2).
While participation in the wage labour force did not change much post-liberalization, the share of
both men and women reporting cultivation did increase, although the increase for women was
slightly higher. Thus, between 93-94 and 99-00 it was cultivation that absorbed the bulk of the
shift of both men and women into agricultural employment. This, combined with the decline (as
per NSS estimates) in the absolute number of men and women reporting performing principal or
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weekly status non-agricultural work suggests increasingly reliance upon agriculture for rural
families, and thus an increased vulnerability to agrarian distress.
To summarise, the data for the period 93-94 to 99-00 shows i) the deepening reliance
upon agriculture as a source of livelihood in rural Telangana; ii) the persistence of a historically
feminized agricultural wage labour force and iii) the rising share of women and men in ownaccount agricultural work.
The decrease in women reporting their principal or weekly status occupation as
‘domestic’ work may account for at least part of the inflow of female workers into agriculture.
Supporters of liberalization have certainly pointed to the movement of women into the workforce
as one of the primary benefits of increased liberalization (World Bank 2000).
Given the prior discussion of the diversity of women’s occupations, one caveat here is
that this change more likely reflects an increase in hours devoted to non-domestic work, rather
than a shift from purely domestic to primarily non-domestic work. However, it certainly could be
the case that the increases in agricultural work were driven by increased demand and thus had
positive rather than negative welfare implications. What complicates the picture in Telangana is
that changes in agricultural wages in this period do not support such an interpretation. I now turn
to a discussion of the changes in real agricultural wages to more closely examine the welfare
implications of the increased participation in agriculture.
Agricultural Wages in Telangana
Telangana witnessed significant agricultural real wage growth during the 1970s – the
time of a violent Maoist peasant struggle and associated redistributions of land – as well as
through the 1980s when a wave of commercialization under the newly small-farmer dominated
agrarian structure commenced. In the 1990s however, one of the most significant changes in the
agrarian economy was the slowing of real wage growth for both male and female agricultural
labourers. From average exponential rates of growth of 4.5% from 1980 to 1989, real wage
growth slowed to around 1.5% between 1990 and 2000 (Vakulabharanam 2004). Indeed there
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was a negative correlation between agricultural output growth and real wage growth from 1994 to
2000 for this region (Vakulabharanam 2004).
Recent reviews of wage data from different sources indicate that this overall slowdown in
agricultural wage growth in the 1990s has been accompanied by a widening of the gender wage
differential at the wider Andhra Pradesh state level (Chavan and Bedamatta 2006; Srivastava and
Singh 2006). In Telangana too, both the NSS data for ‘daily status’ agricultural wage labourers
and annual district level agricultural wage data collected by the Ministry of Agricultural Statistics
suggest that in real terms, the gap between male and female wage growth widened over the
period. The district level data shows some fluctuations, but indicates overall an average annual
growth of 3% in the real gender wage differential from 93-94 to 00-01 (Figure 1). NSS data
points to a sharper increase of 14% in the gender wage gap between 93-94 and 99-00 (Table 4).
(Fig 1 about here)
Within a demand and supply perspective, the trends noted earlier of increasing shares of
the work force reporting agricultural work in general and own-account agriculture in particular,
point to one possible explanation for stagnant agricultural wage growth. The increased use of
family labour in agriculture has countered the wage effects of increased demand for labour within
agriculture. To the extent that this trend is stronger for women, the impact on female agricultural
wages is greater.
However, there may be a different way in which the increased use of female family
labour in agriculture impacts the agricultural wage labour force.
If we shift our attention away from purely supply and demand factors to the underlying
institutional factors that influence wage setting in these markets, we could argue that the
persistent and widening gender wage gap implies that women agricultural wage labourers were
less successful in negotiating wage increases in the post-liberalization period. In a period when
rates of inflation observed for the Consumer Price Index (Agricultural Labourers) from 1993 to
2001 averaged 9% p.a., close to double those observed in the 80s (Reddy, Galab and Rao 2003),
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agricultural wage labourers would have had to negotiate significantly higher nominal wage
increases in the 1990s to be able to account for increased inflation rates in this period. Perhaps
women wage workers have been less able to do so in 1990s Telangana.
Previous research has suggested that socialization processes that emphasise female
obedience and passivity may explain why women workers do not push for higher wages (Seguino
2000). Without denying the importance of socialization, I argue based on my fieldwork data that
as a result of the division of labour within cultivator households in Telangana, many women
agricultural labourers who also perform cultivation work are under greater pressure to restrict
wage bargaining. Farms in the region are relatively female-labour intensive implying that a rise in
female wages has a greater negative impact upon farm profits. I also argue that this pressure may
have intensified post-liberalization. The conventional understanding of women and men from
cultivator households is that they have stronger fallback positions than those with no cultivable
land and thus are better able to negotiate favourable economic outcomes. My hypothesis is that
this relationship does not necessarily hold given the particular gender division of labour in the
region and rising capital costs for farmers post-liberalization.
The NSS data used later in the paper to test this hypothesis does limit the study in at least
two ways. The gender wage gap being analyzed here may partly be the result of gendered
migration trends putting upward pressure on male wages. There is no direct evidence on
migration in the NSS data for 93-94, preventing this hypothesis from being tested. However, as
seen earlier, the NSS employment data indicate increasing absolute numbers as well as
percentages of men involved in agriculture (and specifically in cultivation) between 93-94 and
99-00. Even if the survey misses some men who have migrated, the ones who remain are more
rather than less involved with agriculture compared to the previous round, mitigating any upward
pressure on male wages due to migration. Indeed, as discussed earlier, the literature on the region
suggests that the wage increases even men experienced were smaller than increases experienced
in the 1980s.
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A second caveat is that the NSS data only partially accounts for differing workday
lengths, differentiating between a ‘half day’ (counted as 0.5 days) and a ‘full day’ (counted as 1
day). However, it does not capture finer variations in hours within those two categories. Part of
any gender wage gap observed may be a result of differing lengths of the ‘full’ work day for
women and men. However, given that the measurement is done in a consistent manner across the
two rounds, any changes in the gender wage gap from one period to another would have to result
from a reduction in average daily hours of work for women in 99-00 compared to 93-94, while
male hours remained the same or increased. There is little evidence from non-NSS sources to
suggest that this may be the case. One study that does evaluate male and female work hours in the
neighboring region of Rayalseema argues that in the early 1990s female work hours in agriculture
actually increased (DaCorta andVenkateshwarulu 1999). While there is no way to directly test
this hypothesis with the available NSS data for Telangana, if women’s work hours as cultivators
actually increased as a means of cutting wage costs, then this study would tend to underestimate
the gender wage gap.
I now turn to my fieldwork to present a more micro-level picture of the conditions under
which men and women labour in Telangana.
The View from the Field
The Gender Division of Labour in Agriculture
My fieldwork took place in two Telangana villages, Nayanunipalle and Khanapur,
located in Mahbubnagar district where I spent nine months from July, 2001 to March 2002 as part
of dissertation work on gender, liberalization and agrarian change in Telangana. It included
participant observation as well as surveys and interviews conducted over this period. I use this
fieldwork to provide the context for the hypothesis being tested in this paper.
As other studies in South India have noted, while male tasks in the agricultural cycle vary
by crop, they most often include ploughing, transport, clearing of fields, digging irrigation ditches
and guarding the crops at night (Kapadia 1995; DaCorta and Venkateshwarulu 1999). The first of
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these tasks has, to some extent, been taken over by the tractor, the most important reason I was
given for the reduced demand for male agricultural labour in recent times. On the other hand, a
different aspect of men’s work as cultivators was becoming increasingly important. It was only
men who travelled outside the village both to buy crucial inputs into production – fertilisers,
pesticides, seeds – as well as to sell the harvested crop in wholesale markets. Negotiating these
deals was crucial to the success of the farm -- the process of ‘immiserising growth’ in
Telangana’s agriculture discussed earlier is believed to be a result of the structural inability of
farmers in this region to negotiate favourable terms with suppliers of credit and other inputs
(Vakulabharanam 2005).
Despite men owning land and listing themselves as cultivators more often than women,
women’s work is crucial to agricultural production due to the “sex-sequential” (Agarwal 1994)
nature of agricultural tasks. The important operations of sowing, weeding, transplanting and
harvesting are performed by women as has been documented by various studies on Telangana
(Mies and Lalita 1986; Revathi 1994;Ramamurthy 2000). Apart from women workers being
required to perform the above tasks in the agricultural cycle, women in a farmer household are
responsible for another key task -- the recruiting, supervision and payment of female agricultural
labourers.
Most of my interviews with women took place early in the morning before women left
for work, and during the peak agricultural season these interviews were constantly punctuated by
visits from other women seeking to recruit the group of ten or so female labourers that most small
farms required to carry out sowing or transplanting work for the day. Given the simultaneous
peaking of demand, this was not always an easy task, and I witnessed long drawn out arguments
between the women about promises to come to work made and broken. For women in cultivator
households, significant time and energy thus went into the recruitment of other women workers.
The best way to secure labour seemed to be to agree to work on a woman’s field to ensure her
reciprocity when it came to one’s own labour needs.
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Better-off, upper caste women did not perform labour in the fields of others even though
their supervisory role was extremely important. I closely observed three ‘kapu’ (landlord) women
from families with landholdings of greater than 50 acres. They were always there when women
labourers were performing the tasks of transplanting and weeding; they supervised the ploughing
of rice fields by male labourers; and when the family’s cattle were brought home every night by
their ‘jeetagadu’ or male hired labourer, they kept an eye on whether they were all back safely.
Their husbands travelled a great deal to the urban centres of Mahbubnagar and Hyderabad,
involved, as many other men seemed to be, in negotiations around procuring inputs for the farm,
diversifying the family’s investments in the city and building and maintaining networks of family
and friends that were crucial to success in both of those endeavours.
Given than they did not actually hire their own labour out, however, in seasons of high
labour demand these upper-caste women needed ways of recruiting women without just the
incentive of very high wages. Recruiting women labourers under these circumstances depended a
great deal upon the relations that the women of the household maintained with women in the
village through the year. Whether it was letting women watch television in the house or lending
them money or milk, there were a variety of ways in which relationships of trust and dependence
were established between the women of these large powerful households and other women of the
village despite the decline of more obvious relations of dependence such as bonded labour. The
success of the family farm thus depended in both more and less obvious ways upon the women of
the household.
Implications of the gender division of labour for wage bargaining
While numerous field studies document women’s role as agricultural workers in India,
economic models of small farm production that explain the impact of economic policies such as
structural adjustment while taking into account women’s role as producers are less common. Such
models have been developed for the African context to show that taking the gender division of
labour into account helps to explain the ‘perverse’ supply response of food output in Africa
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(Darity 1995, Warner and Campbell 2000, Evers and Walters 2001). Unlike Africa, however,
crops are not defined as ‘male’ or ‘female’ in India. Instead tasks within the work cycle for each
crop are defined as ‘male’ or female so that any crop cultivated requires a certain amount of male
labour and a certain amount of female labour.
Models of rural household production decisions that extend beyond the African context
have tended to focus upon the implications of women’s contributions to the production of
household goods and thus the impact of macroeconomic policies upon their leisure time and
intensity of work (Floro 1995; Braunstein 2004). In this paper the focus is on women’s
contribution to farm output rather than to household goods. The underlying argument links female
work and wages using a ‘bargaining power approach’ (Seiz 1994). While Appendix 1 provides a
formal mathematical model, in this section I discuss the logic of this underlying model in nonmathematical terms.
The fundamental insight of bargaining models is that economic outcomes – intrahousehold allocation of resources, for example – are negotiated rather than being simple
responses to prices and relative differences in productivity (Quisumbing 2003). Empirical
evidence has cast doubt upon traditional “unitary” models of the household, leading to the
increasing use of collective models of the household in which the preferences of individual
household members can differ, and income streams are not wholly pooled (Quisumbing and
Maluccio 2000). For feminists this approach has proved to be an interesting way to raise issues of
power despite concerns about methodological individualism and the emphasis upon quantifiable
‘material’ bases of bargaining power rather than contestation over symbolic meanings
(Charusheela 2003).
Along with education and asset ownership, wages are widely seen as an important
determinant of bargaining power, but, as Agarwal (1997) points out, they also need to be
bargained for, setting up the possibility of virtuous or vicious cycles in which the outcomes of
intra-household bargaining affect and are affected by extra-household outcomes such as wages.
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Research in rural South India suggests that wages in the region are impacted both by the
forces of demand and supply as well as by explicit bargaining (Ramamurthy 2000; Kapadia
1995). The effect of the former was seen in the fact that in both Telangana villages discussed
above, there was a clear ‘peak’ wage that corresponded to the period of high agricultural demand.
Villagers pointed to the impact upon wages of seasonal out-migration and construction work in
nearby towns. But I was also told by Dalit women “haven’t the prices of chillies and salt risen?
We all got together and made the ‘kapollu’ (large farmers) pay us more”. While I did not have the
opportunity to study the influence of work gangs (“guttis”in Telangana) several respondents did
mention that wages were higher “since we have ‘guttis’”, implying that bargaining by workers
did matter.
An important implication of the nature of women’s involvement in the agrarian economy
in Telangana is that we do not find a gender differentiated employer–worker relationship within
agriculture, but instead a network within which wage workers in agriculture are predominantly
women, as are those who most directly recruit, supervise and pay them. In fact in villages like
Nayanunipalle where most households own and farm some land, women from a cultivator
household typically accompany the group of female wage workers recruited for the day to the
farmland and work alongside them till the end of the day before paying them, only to reverse the
process the next day as part of a group recruited to work on another woman’s farm.
In conversations with women and NGO workers this emerged as a possible reason for the
persistent gender wage differential that remained in agriculture. Several women justified rather
than protested against the existence of the gender wage differential, repeating the statement that
“men do heavier work” even in the face of NGO workers’ arguments that women’s work was just
as burdensome and “heavy”. One could argue make the ‘false consciousness’ argument that
gendered processes of socialization blind women to the parity between the work they do and the
work that men do (see Agarwal (1997) for a critique). However, context does seem to matter
here. Hart (1991) describes the situation in Malaysia where women agricultural workers seemed
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to exhibit greater signs of class consciousness than male workers. Within Telangana, the
reluctance of agricultural workers to organize contrasted sharply with successful union organizing
of women ‘beedi’ (home-rolled cigarettes) workers in the very same villages.
Caste and class clearly play a crucial role in segmenting the female agricultural labour
force, with even women agricultural workers from the same caste divided by class (Agarwal
1994; Kapadia 1995). Telangana is no different – ‘beedi’ work was dominated by Dalits, who are
also less likely to own land – but discussions with NGO workers regarding the practicalities of
organizing female agricultural labourers brought up another possible explanation for women’s
reluctance to organize.
For women who are both own-account farm workers as well as wage workers, the
economic benefits of increases in real wages are ambiguous. The wage they receive today must
be paid out to someone else tomorrow. A family farm of an acre would employ perhaps one day
of male labour to dig ditches or help the man of the household complete ploughing. The same
farm, on the other hand, would employ at least ten women days of labour to complete weeding
and transplanting alone. Of the wage cost of this farm, men’s wages would account for a much
smaller share. The stakes these women have as workers in rising agricultural wages are thus
offset by their concern for keeping the costs of production down – particularly as the costs of
inputs such as fertilisers and electricity have gone up post-liberalization. Under conditions of
reduced profitability in agriculture increases in female own-account cultivation work may then be
accompanied by widening gender wage differentials in agriculture and, as a consequence,
possibly even falling female intra-household bargaining power.
Testing the Hypothesis
The hypothesis being tested here is that the broad climate of agrarian distress in
Telangana in the post liberalization period has resulted in female agricultural wage workers from
cultivator households facing greater pressure to restrict bargaining over agricultural wages. Given
that some men also occupy this ‘dual class’ status, the negative impact of own-account cultivation
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upon male agricultural wages may exist, but the greater impact of higher female wages upon farm
profits implies that such effects would be stronger for women.
Given that many women and men from cultivator households may only perform
occasional agricultural wage work, I use the NSS’ ‘daily status’ data to identify economically
active, adult men and women who report any agricultural wage work at all, whether for a
minority or majority of their working week. Similarly, I use the same daily status data to identify
male and female adult workers who perform some own-account agricultural or cultivation work
(including as unpaid helpers on their family farms).
For both men and women, there was a sharp and almost identical increase in the
percentage of ‘daily status’ agricultural wage workers reporting some cultivation work as well
(Table 3). The percentage for men started out a little higher and remained so in 99-00. However,
given the larger number of female agricultural wage labourers, in absolute terms NSS estimates
the number of such ‘dual class’ female workers increased by more.
(Table 3 about here)
Using the individual level NSS data on ‘daily status’, I also obtained agricultural wage
data from the responses of those who reported agricultural labour as any one of their top four
activities for the week. An average agricultural daily wage was calculated for each such
respondent. This was deflated using the Andhra Pradesh Consumer Price Index for Agricultural
Labourers with a base year of 86-87 (=100), so that the real wage figures reported below are in
86-87 rupees. To provide a comparison to current prices, the index was 4.5 times larger in 200809 (448) than in 86-87(100).
(Table 4 about here)
As can be seen in Table 4, the gender wage differential widened in 99-00. Table 5
suggests that average wages did not rise as much for female wage labourers overall, and
marginally less for women reporting some cultivation work, when compared to their male
counterparts. While in both NSS rounds male ‘dual class’ workers had higher average wages, for
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women this was, if at all, only the case in 93-94. While higher average wages for ‘dual class’
male workers confirm the conventional hypothesis that such workers have higher fallback
positions, the evidence for women is less clear. A two-sample group mean test did not confirm
that this difference was statistically significant.
(Table 5 about here)
To more rigorously test the hypothesis that the unfolding of liberalization in this region
may have negatively impacted the underlying bargaining position of ‘dual class’ women, I turn to
regression analysis. I use the wage data to evaluate the extent to which the wages of women may
be held down, post-liberalization, by their dual role as both own-account as well as wage workers
in agriculture.
Regression Analysis
The analysis of agricultural wage work differs from regression analysis of wages in
formal industrial or service sector contexts, in that compensation is unlikely to depend upon
conventional measures of skill such as years of education. Unsurprisingly, a majority of both men
and women in this dataset had not completed even primary school. Age provides the best proxy
for experience, but at the same time can be a liability in what is physically taxing work. Trying to
explain the wage earned by a worker in this context is thus likely to be challenging.
In this paper I use a standard ordinary least squares(OLS) regression technique, with the
dependent variable being the log average agricultural wage reported. I restrict the sample to adult
men and women who report performing some daily status agricultural wage labour. An
alternative to the use of OLS would be to use a correction for sample selection bias in a double
selection framework, given that workers must first choose to be economically active and then
choose to perform agricultural wage labour. Results using this double selection method are
available upon request from the author but since they did not differ from those obtained using
OLS, I report only the latter in this paper.
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Turning to the independent variables used in the wage regression, the variables relevant
to the hypothesis being tested are:
i) A dummy variable to indicate whether daily status agricultural workers (male and female
combined) also reported any daily status cultivation work and thus occupied this ‘dual class’
status. As mentioned earlier, members of cultivator households are generally believed to have
higher fallback positions and thus better able to bargain for higher wages.
ii) A time, gender and occupation interaction dummy that tests whether such the effect of being
such a dual-class status worker had a negative effect for women in 99-00. My hypothesis suggests
that this variable would have a negative and statistically significant coefficient.
I also use conventional group and household level characteristics to control for other
possible determinants of wages earned.
(Table 6 about here)
I use the district within which the worker resides to control for possible regional
variations in wages. Apart from age (along with a squared term) and primary school completion, I
include the worker ratio, assuming that larger households with higher worker ratios may have
better fallback positions and thus allow workers greater bargaining power and wages. Female
headed households are, however, generally considered to have lower fallback positions,
increasing the ‘push’ to obtain work.
Membership in the least privileged scheduled caste/tribe groups could have a negative
effect upon wages if such workers have lower bargaining power because of their lower social
status. However, sociologists have pointed out a different, perhaps looser, model of patriarchy at
work in lower caste groups that may result in female workers from these groups more effectively
pushing for higher wages.
I also include dummies indicating whether the worker was unmarried, as well as whether
the spouse (or household head if unmarried/spouse not specified) had completed at least primary
school, and whether the spouse (or household head if unmarried/spouse not specified) was a
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principal or weekly status agricultural worker. Given the linkage between marriage and status in
Indian households, being unmarried may in fact decrease bargaining power for women, although
the impact for men is less clear. The impacts of spousal education and occupation upon fall back
positions depend upon the workings of patriarchy in these households and are thus theoretically
ambiguous in a sample that combines men and women.
A dummy variable indicating whether the worker was female tests whether a gender
wage differential remains after controlling for these individual and household characteristics. A
time interaction term for gender tests whether the gender wage differential increased in 99-00, all
else constant.

Results of Regression Analysis
The results of ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors are reported in
Table 7, Regression 1. The overall fit of the regression appears acceptable based upon F-test and
adjusted R- square results. The fact that the adjusted R-square is 0.31 is not surprising since
agricultural wage earnings in developing countries tend to be difficult to explain fully.
(Table 7 about here)
Age has a positive effect upon wages, as it would if it was a proxy for experience, but the
effect diminishes with years. This is expected given the physically taxing nature of the work.
Also as expected, the completion of primary school did not have a statistically significant effect
upon wages earned. Somewhat surprisingly, caste, the household worker ratio and being from a
female headed household did not have statistically significant effects upon wages earned. Being
unmarried had a statistically significant negative effect upon wages, while the education and
occupation of the spouse/household head did not.
The time dummy tells us that wages did rise in 99-00, as we saw in the tables earlier, but
female workers earned less after controlling for these other individual and household level
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variables. The statistical significance of the time and gender interaction dummy confirms that the
gender wage differential widened in 99-00.
Overall, cultivation work did indeed have a positive effect upon wages as usually
expected. However, the negative and statistically significant coefficient for the time, gender and
cultivation interaction term indicates that women who reported some own-account work did see a
greater decline in wage growth in 99-00. F-tests confirmed that both the coefficients were
statistically significantly non-zero.
These results are in accordance with the hypothesis presented earlier, even though the
effect does not appear to be very large. Importantly, if female cultivator work days increased in
length, this may lead to an underestimation of this effect. Furthermore, the lowered bargaining
power of ‘dual class’ female workers does not completely explain the increased gender wage
differential in 99-00, given that the time_gender interaction dummy continues to be statistically
significant. As previously discussed, gendered migration trends may play a role as well.
However, this result does point to one possible way that women’s wages have been adversely
affected in aftermath of liberalization and suggests the need for further research on the changing
nature of women’s role as cultivators.
Alternative Specification
In the specification above, the time, gender and cultivation dummy could simply be
picking up the impact of increased cultivation work by both genders in the 99-00 period.
Controlling for this possibility requires the inclusion of an additional interaction term,
time_cultivation, which is the product of the time dummy and the dummy for reported cultivation
work. Including this term proves to be problematic due to the high correlation (0.7) between the
time_cultivation and time_gender_cultivation dummies. Given my argument that in absolute
terms more women became ‘dual class’ workers between NSS rounds 50 and 55, this high
correlation is not surprising. However, it means that the inclusion of both these interaction terms
raises the problem of multicollinearity. As seen in Table 7, Regression 2, after including
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time_cultivation term, both time_gender_cultivation and time_cultivation become insignificant at
the 5% level (and the confidence intervals vary across zero).
To resolve this specification issue therefore, Table 7, Regression 3 reports the results of
dropping the time_gender_cultivation term. The time_cultivation interaction term alone is
statistically insignificant, indicating that the effect upon agricultural wages of being a ‘dual class’
worker is likely to be specific to the women in the sample.
Implications of the results
In this paper I attempt to understand the implications of the agrarian distress experienced
in the Telangana region post-liberalisation for women in cultivator households. The empirical
analysis above suggests one possible mechanism by which the pressures faced by farm
households affected women workers. To the extent that wage growth for women is restricted to a
greater degree, and to the extent that wage earnings do in fact impact women’s bargaining power,
the regression results imply that wage work for these women became less rather than more
empowering. As the wider feminist literature on the effects on economic crises suggests, the
transmission mechanisms of crises, in this case in agriculture, are likely to be gendered and
women often bear the burden of adjusting to crises in ways that are not obvious to policy makers.
In the last four years the national and state governments in India have paid greater
attention to the generation of rural employment and limited social safety net programs. This paper
restricts itself to the immediate aftermath of liberalization in Telangana. Further research is
required to examine the impacts of programs such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme(NREGS) upon women workers in this region. However, while the NREGS provides
much-needed additional rural employment, this paper focuses more on the pressures faced by
cultivators and the ways in which the deterioration of conditions for cultivators in the region can
undermine efforts to prop up real wages. The problem of rising capital costs for cultivator
households has still not received sufficient attention from policymakers.
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The result also suggests that while the unionization of agricultural wage labourers is one
of the most important outstanding tasks of the labour movement in India, in regions like
Telangana women agricultural workers face contradictory pulls and may or may not respond to
calls to organise.
Conclusions
Women’s labour force participation is a potentially important determinant of improved
bargaining outcomes for women. The literature suggests both that the conditions under which
women labour and the reasons why they participate shape the extent to which this potential for
empowerment is realised. Rural Telangana, the part of India studied in this paper has traditionally
had a feminized agricultural labour force. However, agricultural wage growth in Telangana
slowed in the immediate aftermath of liberalization, while the gender wage gap widened.
Based on field observation of the gender division of labour within agriculture in the
region, I use a household model to explore the link between women’s roles in own-farm work,
women’s wage labour in agriculture and their bargaining power within the household. Given the
pressure on profit margins as a result of rising input costs post-liberalization, I argue that female
labourers’ ability to bargain for higher wages within agriculture is adversely affected by the dual
position several of these women occupy in being both cultivators and agricultural wage labourers.
Despite data limitations, NSS surveys provide some evidence for the latter hypothesis suggesting
that there is a need for further research that takes into account the impact of economic policies
upon women, not just as consumers or as wage labourers, but as important contributors to small
farm agriculture in India.
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Tables
Fig 1: Real Wage Growth in Telangana from 1993 to 2001
(with exponential growth trend lines fitted)
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Source: Agricultural Wages in Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad: Directorate of Economics and Statistics.

Table 1: Rural Telangana: Participation in the labour force
The economically active
Non-domestic workers as a share of
as a share of adults
all economically active adults
Male
Female
Male
Female
82-83
91.5
92.7
99.7
79.3
87-88
91.2
91.3
99.8
79.6
93-94
89.8
91.7
99.8
81.4
99-00
87.8
88.9
99.8
82.8
Source: NSSO, various years

Table 2 Rural Telangana: Agricultural work as a share of economically active adults
Principal and weekly status Principal and weekly status
All agricultural work
cultivators
agricultural wage labour
Female
Female
Female
Male
Female share
Male
Female share
Male Female share
82-83
41.2
30.5
44
35.7
38.9
53.6
61.3
47.1
44.9
87-88
41.5
28.8
41.7
35.0
40.6
54.4
62.1
48.2
44.5
93-94
41.3
31.9
44.6
36.8
41.3
53.9
65.6
57.8
47.9
99-00
42.7
33.9
45.6
35.6
41.5
54.8
68.4
62.5
48.7
Source: NSSO, various years
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Table 3: Rural Telangana: Agriculture in ‘daily status’ data (percentages of economically
active adults)

93-94
99-00

Percentage of wage labourers
Agricultural wage labour Cultivation work
reporting some cultivation work
Female
Female
Male Female share
Male Female share
Male
Female
32.6
33.3
51.6
41.7
29.5
42.5
7.2
6.58
32.9
36.6
53.6
46.4
34.5
43.6
14.34
13.56

Source: NSSO, various years

Table 4: Rural Telangana: Real average agricultural wage per day (in 86-87 rupees)
(Adult, economically active, daily status agricultural workers)
Female share
Female
of male wage
93-94
8.68 Rs
6.44 Rs
74.2%
99-00
12.15 Rs
7.78 Rs
64.0%
Source: NSSO, Rounds 50 and 55. Deflated by AP CPI(AL).
Male

Table 5: Rural Telangana: Real average agricultural wage per day by occupation of worker
(in 86-87 Rupees)
(Adult, economically active, daily status agricultural workers)
Male agricultural labourers
Female agricultural labourers
No reported
Cultivation
No reported
Cultivation
cultivation
work reported
cultivation
work reported
93-94
8.6
10.2
6.5
6.4
99-00
12
12.9
7.8
7.8
Source: NSSO, Rounds 50 and 55. Deflated by AP CPI(AL).
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of variables used in regression
(Adult, economically active, daily status agricultural workers)
Variable
(Log) Average agricultural wage per
day
District
Age
Age squared
Caste group (SC/ST)
Primary school completed
Household worker ratio
Female headed household
Gender: woman
Cultivation work also reported
Unmarried
Spouse/Household head primary
school completion
Spouse/Household head agricultural
worker
99-00 time dummy
Time_gender interaction term
Time_gender_cultivation interaction
terms
Time_cultivation interaction term

Number of
observations
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Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

2663
2770
2770
2770
2770
2770
2768
2770
2770
2770
2770

2.07
22.05
33.23
1260.55
0.46
0.15
0.70
0.095
0.53
0.11
0.12

0.45
4.01
12.50
949.77
0.50
0.35
0.22
0.29
0.50
0.32
0.32

-0.47
2
15
225
0
0
0.2
0
0
0
0

3.83
30
80
6400
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2770

0.15

0.36

0

1

2770
2770
2770

0.84
0.52
0.28

0.36
0.50
0.45

0
0
0

1
1
1

2770
2770

0.040
0.08

0.20
0.27

0
0

1
1

Table 7: Regression results
Dependent variable: Log average real agricultural wage

Independent variable
region
age
age-squared
scheduled caste/tribe
member
primary school
completed
household worker
ratio
Female-headed
household
gender: woman
cultivation work also
reported
Unmarried
Spouse/Household
head primary school
completion
Spouse/Household
head agricultural
worker
99-00 time dummy
time_gender
interaction term
time_gender
_cultivation
interaction term
time_cultivation
interaction term
_constant

Regression 1
Number of obs
2661
F( 12, 2648)
85.04
Prob > F
0.000
R-squared
0.3101
Root MSE
0.37238
Robust
Coefficient
std. error

Regression 2
Number of obs
2661
F( 13, 2647)
79.92
Prob > F
0.000
R-squared
0.3103
Root MSE
0.37241
Robust
Coefficient
std. error

Regression 3
Number of obs
2661
F( 12, 2648)
84.56
Prob > F
0.000
R-squared
0.3098
Root MSE
0.37247
Robust
Coefficient
std. error

0.014***
0.011***
-0.0001***

0.002
0.004
0.000

0.014***
0.011***
-0.0001***

0.002
0.004
0.000

0.014***
0.011***
-0.0001***

0.002
0.004
0.000

-0.014

0.015

-0.014

0.015

-0.014

0.015

0.035

0.023

0.036

0.022

0.036

0.022

0.001

0.035

0.002

0.035

0.002

0.035

0.022
-0.314***

0.024
0.024

0.023
-0.314***

0.024
0.024

0.024
-0.315***

0.024
0.024

0.109***
-0.071**

0.028
0.031

0.131***
-0.072**

0.045
0.031

0.131***
-0.073**

0.045
0.031

-0.016

0.021

-0.016

0.021

-0.016

0.021

-0.031
0.327***

0.020
0.021

-0.031
0.332***

0.020
0.022

-0.032
0.337***

0.020
0.022

-0.117***

0.030

-0.120***

0.030

-0.131***

0.029

-0.095**

0.046

-0.074

0.050

1.607***

0.089

-0.044
1.605***

0.056
0.089

-0.082
1.605***

0.051
0.089
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Appendix
The Model of the Household
Let us assume a two-person peasant household in which the primary source of income is
cultivation and sale of a single crop. For simplicity, let us assume that women contribute labour to
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the farm but also perform agricultural wage labour while, due to the feminised nature of the
agricultural workforce, men perform only own-account farm work. Thus only female wage
workers are hired for farm work. Furthermore, agricultural wages are the same across female
workers in a region so that all women are paid the same daily wage.
Following Warner and Campbell (2000), the husband and wife maximise individual
utility functions within a Stackelberg framework. The man has first mover advantage, deciding
how many hours of female labour Lfh will be hired for the family farm. Women can then decide
how many hours they will contribute to the farm, Lf0, taking Lfh as a parameter and then spend the
rest of their fixed extra-household time in agricultural wage work (Lfw). The woman’s reaction
function becomes an input into the man’s prior decision.
Women contribute all of their wage earnings to the household pool and these earnings,
together with farm profits, constitute the household income, I. Men spend some portion of the
combined household income upon male consumption goods (such as tea, snacks, cigarettes and
alcohol) and the remaining is handed over to the woman, whose responsibility it is to buy the
food and other consumption items jointly consumed by the members of the household. The share
of combined household income that the woman receives, µf , is an outcome of household
bargaining and thus, like bargaining power, is in turn a function of the female wage wf such that
δµf / δ wf >0.
While bargaining power is an increasing function of wages, it is less clear whether
bargaining power shows diminishing or increasing returns to wages. The feminist literature tends
to conclude that at low levels of wages and in the absence of ‘decent’ work, the empowering
impact of wage work is likely to be small (Charusheela 2003). Thus at low wage levels,

µf
is
wf

also likely to be small – i.e. incremental increases in wages when wages are low do not increase
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intra-household bargaining power by as much as when wages are high. That is, bargaining
power shows increasing returns to wages so that at low wage rates,

µf
is small.
wf

The woman uses her share of household income to buy C f , the household’s consumption
of food while the man uses his share to buy G m , goods that are only consumed by the man and
only enter into his utility function.
Household Maximization Problem
The woman and man each maximise utility subject to time and budget constraints.
Thus the woman’s maximization problem is:
Max U(Cf)

 2Uf
Uf
Where
> 0,
<0
Cf 2
Cf
s.t.

T = Lfo + Lfw, where T is the fixed total extra-household work time available to the woman
and
P f Cf = µf (wf) I
where I = PQ(L mo , Lfo , Lfh , K) - wf Lfh - Pk K + wf ( T - Lfo)
P, P f ,wf ,Pk ,Q, Lfo , Lmo, Lfh > 0
K is fixed in the short run and Lfh is determined by the husband so that Lfo = f(Lfh ).
Q is a production function that exhibits diminishing returns in each input.
The man’s maximization problem becomes:
Max U(Cf, , Gm,)

 2Uf
 2Uf
Uf
Uf
Where
> 0,
<0; and
> 0,
<0.
Cf 2
Cf
Gm 2
Gm
s.t.

T = Lmo , where T is the total non-leisure time available to the man and is fixed.
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and
P mGm = (1-µf (wf)) I , where K and Lmo are fixed and Lfo =f(Lfh).
By substitution,
Cf, = (µf (wf)/ P f ) I
And Gm=

(1 - µf (wf)Pf
Cf
µf (wf )Pm

The first order condition for an optimal solution for the woman is:
δ U f /δ Lfo =0;
δU f /δ Cf >0 => δ Cf /δ Lfo =0
=> δ Q/δ Lfo= wf/P …………….(i)
and the first order condition for the man’s optimization problem is:
δ Um/δ Lfh =0;
δ U m /δ Cf >0 and δ U m /δ Gm >0
=> δQ/δ Lfh= wf/P ………………(ii)
Taking the total derivative of (i) and (ii) with respect to the wage,

 2Q
dLf 0
Lf 0 Lfh
 2
dLfh
 Q
Lf 0 2
If female own-farm labour is at least partly supervisory, it would seem reasonable that the
marginal productivity of hired labour is increased by an incremental increase in own farm labour.
Thus,

 2Q
dLf 0
>0, =>
>0.
dLfh
Lf 0Lfh

dLfh

dwf
p(

1
 2Q
Lfh 2

<0

)
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and

dLf 0

dwf

1
[
 2Q
p(
)
Lf 0 2

 2Q
 2Q

Lfh 2 Lf 0Lfh
 2Q
Lfh 2

] <0

Thus the amount of female labour the man wishes to hire for the family farm decreases with an
increase in the female wage, while on the other hand, increases in the wage rate increase women’s
desire to supply agricultural wage work.
We assume that female workers bargain for higher wages if wage increases result in an
increase in utility. At least for those women from peasant households, however, the change in
utility as a result of increases in wage may or may not be positive.

dUf * (Cf *) Uf dCf

dwf
Cf dwf
By assumption,

Uf
>0.
Cf

Cf Cf dLfh Cf dLfo
dCf
=


wf Lfh dwf Lfo dwf
dwf
From first order conditions,

Cf
Cf
=0 and
=0.
Lfh
Lfo

Thus
1 µf
dCf
=
[
( I*) - µf ( Lfh* + Lfo*)]
Pf wf
dwf
Let Z=

1 µf
[
( I*) - µf ( Lfh* + Lfo*)]
Pf wf

Thus for

dUf * (Cf *)
>0, or for rises in wages to be welfare enhancing for these women,
dwf

it must be the case that Z>0
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or

µf
( I*) > µf ( Lfh* + Lfo*) ……..(iii)
wf
If bargaining power shows increasing returns to wages, at low wage rates,

µf
is small
wf

in equation (iii) above. At low levels of wages I* is likely to be high but so is Lfh*.The relative
sizes of each would determine whether or not condition (iii) will hold and

dUf * (Cf *)
>0. An
dwf

increase in wages thus may or may not result in increases in female welfare overall, and thus
lowers the incentive to participate in the process of bargaining for higher wages.
The situation would be different for women from non-cultivating households for whom
rising real wages in agriculture would be unambiguously welfare enhancing. However, if a
significant share of the female agricultural labour-force is comprised of women from peasant
households, the ability of women workers to effectively bargain as a unit would be influenced by
the incentives of the latter.
Impact of Liberalization
Belief in the empowering effects of female labour force participation is an important
aspect of the claim that liberalised economies are associated with increases in women’s wellbeing. Liberalisation is linked to increased labour force participation, and reduced gender wage
differentials. Women’s labour force participation is in turn linked with improved bargaining
outcomes for women (World Bank 2001). The impact of liberalisation in rural Telangana may,
however, have a less positive impact upon the bargaining power of women.
As discussed earlier, the price of important capital inputs such as electricity and fertilizer
in the Telangana region rose in the aftermath of liberalization, while output prices remained
stagnant (Vakulabharanam 2004, Rao and Suri 2006). In the model above, taking total
derivatives of the first order conditions with respect to Pk,

dLfh
dLfo
=0 and
=0
dPk
dPk
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and

dI *
= - (µf / Pf ) K , < 0
dPk

Thus

dZ
µf
µf K/Pf , < 0
dPk
wf
A rising price of capital makes it less likely that the condition (iii) above under which

increases in wages would increase women’s utility will be satisfied. Thus the unfolding of
liberalization in Telangana, given the highly feminised agricultural wage labour-force, could
imply that women are dissuaded from bargaining for higher wages as workers, thus contributing
further to the widening of the gender wage differential.
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